TCPSnitch: Dissecting the Usage of the Socket API by Schueren, Gregory Vander et al.
TCPSnitch: Dissecting the Usage of the Socket API
Gregory Vander Schueren1, Quentin De Coninck2 and Olivier Bonaventure2
Universite Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
1gregory.vanderschueren@gmail.be, 2{first.last}@uclouvain.be
ABSTRACT
Networked applications interact with the TCP/IP stack through
the socket API. Over the years, various extensions have been
added to this popular API. In this paper, we propose and im-
plement the TCPSnitch software that tracks the interactions
between Linux and Android applications and the TCP/IP
stack. We collect a dataset containing the interactions pro-
duced by more than 120 different applications. Our analysis
reveals that applications use a variety of API calls. On An-
droid, many applications use various socket options even if
the Java API does not expose them directly. TCPSnitch and
the associated dataset are publicly available.
1. INTRODUCTION
The socket API was introduced together with release
4.2 of the BSD Unix distribution that included a func-
tional TCP/IP stack [14]. This API allows applications
to interact with the underlying networking stack. When
the socket API was designed, TCP/IP was one family
of network protocols among many others and it was im-
portant to abstract those protocol families. The heart
of the socket API is a set of basic system calls includ-
ing socket, bind, connect, accept, close, listen,
send, receive,. . . Those system calls interact with the
underlying network implementation that is part of the
operating system kernel. The socket API was not the
only approach to interact with the network stack. The
STREAM API, based on [16] was extended to support
the TCP/IP protocol stack and used in Unix System V
[15].
Over the years, the popularity of the socket API grew
in parallel with the deployment of the global Internet.
Nowadays, the socket API is considered by many as the
standard API for simple networked applications. Sev-
eral popular textbooks are entirely devoted to this API
[20, 7]. Given the importance of web-based applica-
tions, many developers do not interact directly with
the socket API anymore but rely on higher-level ab-
stractions. For example, programming languages such
as Java or Python include libraries exposing URL and
implementations of HTTP/HTTPS. For C developers,
libraries such as libcurl also provide higher level ab-
stractions.
During the last 30 years, the socket API has evolved,
with new features added over the years. Some were ded-
icated to the support of specific features, such as ATM
[4] or Quality of Service [3]. Other extensions [13, 8]
focused on improving the interactions between applica-
tions and the underlying stack through poll/select,
epoll,. . . On Linux, new system calls to directly send
pages or entire files (like sendfile) were added. Fur-
thermore, socket extensions have been defined for each
new transport protocol [17, 12]. Socket extensions have
also been proposed to deal with multihoming [18] and
specific APIs have been implemented on top of Multi-
path TCP [9, 10].
Recently, the Internet Engineering Task Force cre-
ated the Transport Services (taps) working group whose
main objective is to help application and network stack
programmers by describing an (abstract) interface for
applications to make use of Transport Services. Al-
though this work will focus on abstract transport ser-
vices, understanding how the current APIs are used
by existing applications will help in designing generic
transport services that correspond to their needs.
We propose TCPSnitch, an open-source software that
collects detailed traces of the interactions between net-
worked applications and the Linux TCP/IP stack and
sends them to a publicly available database exposing
various statistics. This paper is organized as follows.
We first describe TCPSnitch in section 2. Then we
present in section 3 the traces that we collected from
90 different Android applications. Section 4 analyses
in more details the utilization of UDP sockets by those
applications while section 5 focuses on the TCP sock-
ets. We summarize the main findings of this work and
future work in section 6.
2. TCPSNITCH
Different solutions have been proposed and imple-
mented to analyze the utilization of system and library
calls by applications. Two approaches are possible.
The first one is to analyze the application code (bi-
nary or sometimes source for open-source applications)
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
00
67
4v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 2 
No
v 2
01
7
and extract the interesting calls from the corresponding
files. Several researchers have adopted this approach to
study networked applications. In 2011, [11] analyzed
the source code of 2187 Ubuntu applications to detect
the presence of certain keywords of the socket API. In
2016, [21] disassembled binaries of 30K Linux applica-
tions using objdump and performed a call-graph anal-
ysis to study the Linux API usage. Still in 2016, [5]
proposed libtrack and analyzed 1.1M Android appli-
cations for linkage with POSIX functions. The main
advantage of this approach is that it is possible to an-
alyze a large number of applications to determine the
system calls used by the majority of the applications.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to determine which
parameters are passed to these identified functions or
how frequently they are called. Source code analysis is
also impractical for closed-source applications.
The second approach is to instrument the application
and intercept the system or library calls. On Unix vari-
ants, the strace or ltrace applications can be used
to collect traces of the system or library calls. The
libtrack tool proposed by [5] also supports dynamic
tracing of functions invocations. TCPSnitch currently
intercepts 40 functions that are related to the network
stack. TCPSnitch tracks the functions that are ap-
plied on each socket with their timestamp, parameters
and return value. It also collects metadata informa-
tion such as system information, the network config-
uration and the kernel version. Compared to simpler
tools like strace and libtrack, a major benefit of
TCPSnitch is that all the data collected during the uti-
lization of an application can be uploaded on a public
database. The web interface of this database, avail-
able on https://tcpsnitch.org, provides different vi-
sualizations of the database and allow users to browse
through the collected traces. TCPSnitch is written in
C and counts about 6500 lines of code, without blanks
and comments.
Compared to the first approach, the main advantage
of TCPSnitch is that it can trace sequences of calls and
also collect information about the function parameters
and the return values. This enables us to observe how
and when socket API calls and options are used, the size
of the buffers used by send()/recv(), which thread
called the API function,. . . While static analysis tools
such as [11] or [21] give indications about the possible
usage of some socket API calls or options, TCPSnitch
allows observing their actual use.
Since TCPSnitch uses LD PRELOAD like strace to in-
tercept the functions calling the system calls in the stan-
dard C library, it is possible for applications to bypass
TCPSnitch by either being statically linked with the C
library or directly using the system calls. Before an-
alyzing the results, it is important to note one caveat
about the utilization of TCPSnitch on Android appli-
cations. On Android, applications do not usually call
exit() because they typically remain running or idle
once started. To end the tracing of an Android applica-
tion, TCPSnitch calls the force-stop command of the
activity manager tool (am) to terminate the application.
This means that the application does not get the oppor-
tunity to cleanly close its opened sockets. This caveat
only affects the interception of the close() function,
not other functions.
To preserve the user privacy, he/she can opt-out for
the collection of sensitive metadata. TCPSnitch does
not trace the utilization of the DNS libraries and thus
does not collect domain names. With send()/recv(),
TCPSnitch only collects the buffer pointers and sizes,
not the actual data. Furthermore, all the non-loopback
or link-local IP addresses that are collected as parame-
ters of the traced system calls are replaced by the low
order 32 (resp. 128) bits of a SHA-1 hash computed
over the concatenation of a random number generated
by TCPSnitch when it starts and the IP address.
3. DATASET
Using TCPSnitch, we recorded traces for 90 Android
and 33 Linux applications by manually interacting with
each application for a few seconds in order to reproduce
a typical usage. We mainly selected popular consumer-
oriented client applications and the dataset currently
does not include any server-side application. For some
popular applications, we recorded multiple traces in dif-
ferent network environments.
We observed major differences in the API usage pat-
terns on Android and Linux. For instance, the most
popular API functions differ and applications use differ-
ent recurring combinations of socket options. In accor-
dance with [5], we confirm that high-level frameworks
and libraries drive the API usage and are at the root of
such glaring disparities. Due to space limitations, we re-
strict our analysis to the Android dataset for the rest of
this paper. The full dataset with various visualizations
is publicly available from https://tcpsnitch.org.
Our Android dataset mostly includes highly popu-
lar applications from different categories of apps in the
Google Play Store. Table 1 shows a sample of repre-
sentative applications. At the time of writing, all An-
droid traces have been recorded on Android 6.0.1 with
a LG Nexus 5 device. In total, the Android dataset
includes 181 application traces that opened a total of
16.384 sockets. This represents about 2.3M intercepted
function calls.
3.1 Usage of the socket API functions
The socket API contains various functions that often
have overlapping purposes. For instance, there are as
many as 7 functions to send data: write(), send(),
sendto(), writev(), sendmsg(),sendmmsg() and
2
Category Applications
Social Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin
Streaming Spotify, Netflix, Soundcloud
Video-telephony Skype, Viber, Hangout
Shopping Amazon, AliExpress, Zalando
Browsers Chrome, Firefox, Opera
Productivity Evernote, Slack, Mega
Video/photo Youtube, Instagram, Pinterest
Table 1: Sample applications. The Android dataset con-
tains traces of 90 applications from different categories of
apps in the Google Play Store.
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API functions usage
Figure 1: API functions usage. A dozen API functions are
used by almost all applications. Vectored I/O functions are
mostly unused.
sendfile(). Figure 1 shows the number of applications
using each intercepted function. This section intends to
shed some light about the real usage of these functions.
Some functions are used by a large fraction of the ap-
plications. For instance, getsockopt(), setsockopt()
and fnctl() are used by all the applications in our
dataset and only one application does not call getsock-
name(). Another surprising result is that a textbook
server-side function such as bind() is used by 96% of
our client Android applications. We observe that about
95% of these bind() calls specify INADDR ANY as the IP
address and 0 for the port number (meaning an OS as-
signed random port) but explicitly request for an IPv6
address. This usage is mainly driven by the Socket
class of the Android SDK [2] that caches the local ad-
dress of the socket (using getsockname()) before trying
to connect it.
Some of our observations are dependent on Android
6.0.1. For instance, Bionic, Google’s implementation of
libc, implements some API functions by calling their
more complex sibling, e.g. send() is implemented by
calling sendto(). When the simple version of these
85% Get info about network with ioctl()
8% connect() but does not exchange data
6% Send or receive data
1% Other usages
Table 2: UDP sockets usage. Most UDP sockets do not
send or receive any data but get information about the net-
work environment using ioctl().
’twin’ functions 1 is called, TCPSnitch records 2 consec-
utive function calls although the application code actu-
ally performs a single function call. This means that
the popularity of sendto(), recvfrom(), accept4()
and epoll pwait() is overestimated on Fig. 1.
We did not observe any utilization of sendfile(),
sendmmsg() and recvmmsg(). These 3 functions are
optimizations mostly useful for server-side applications
requiring high-performance. For instance, sendfile()
is a Linux specific call that saves a back-and-forth copy
between kernel and user space when sending a file over
a socket, while sendmmsg() and recvmmsg() allow to
send or receive multiple struct msghdr in a single sys-
tem call.
Figure 1 also shows that vectored I/O functions such
as readv() and recvmsg() are seldom used an Android.
3.2 Types of sockets
In the IPv6 enabled WiFi network used for the ex-
periments, all but one application established a TCP
connection with a remote host over IPv6. This is a con-
firmation of the growing importance of IPv6. All the
surveyed applications opened at least one IPv6 socket
while only 64% opened an IPv4 socket.
While all applications use asynchronous sockets, a
single application used the SOCK NONBLOCK optional flag
when calling socket(). SOCK CLOEXEC was never used.
Most sockets are made asynchronous after their cre-
ation using fcntl(F SETFL) and 5 applications used
ioctl(FIONBIO). Usually, TCP sockets are turned asyn-
chronous just before the connect() call. As a matter a
fact, O NONBLOCK is the only file status flag used by the
studied Android applications with fnctl(F SETFL) and
fnctl(F GETFL). The O APPEND, O ASYNC, O DIRECT and
O NOATIME flags were never used.
4. UDP SOCKETS
We first analyze how UDP is used by the 31 applica-
tions in our dataset that open at least one SOCK DGRAM
socket. Note that those UDP sockets are explicitly re-
quested by the applications themselves since TCPSnitch
does not track getaddrinfo() and related functions
that are part of libc.
1Here is a complete list of these twin functions: send()
calls sendto(), recv() calls recvfrom(), accept() calls
accept4() and epoll wait calls epoll pwait().
3
Request Purpose (get dev *)
44% SIOCGIFADDR Address
25% SIOCGIFNAME Name
20% SIOCGIFFLAGS Active flag word
5% SIOCGIFNETMASK Network mask
5% SIOCGIFBRDADDR Broadcast address
1% Others N/A
Table 3: ioctl() requests breakdown. 85% of the UDP sock-
ets use these requests to get information about the network
devices.
Looking at the amount of data sent/received over
those UDP sockets, we noticed that 85% of the opened
SOCK DGRAM sockets do not send or receive any data.
Those sockets are created to retrieve information about
the networking environment using ioctl(). While a
single application opened 30% of these sockets, 15 ap-
plications use UDP and never send UDP data. Table 3
details the main ioctl() requests. Although those
ioctl() apply to any socket, we suspect that appli-
cations perform them on UDP sockets because they are
cheaper than their TCP counterpart.
Overall, 16 applications sent or received data over
UDP: 5 are video-telephony apps such as Google Hang-
out or Skype, 4 are video or music streaming applica-
tions such as Spotify or Netflix and 3 are Google appli-
cations likely using QUIC like Chrome or Google Plus.
The rest are various applications that only exchange
a few hundred bytes such as Shazam or Angry Birds.
Applications mainly use sendto() and recvfrom() to
send or receive data. We observed that 29% of the re-
ceiving calls set the MSG PEEK to peek on the receiv-
ing queue without removing data and that 0.6% of the
sending calls set the MSG NOSIGNAL flag to prevent a
SIGPIPE from being raised in case of error. We did not
find any indication of the usage of the other flags on
SOCK DGRAM sockets. We noticed that Messenger uses
the SIOCGSTAMP iotcl during video calls roughly every
second recvfrom(). This ioctl allows round trip time
measurements. Among the SOCK DGRAM sockets that we
observed, only 6% sent or received data. It is interest-
ing to note that 8% of the SOCK DGRAM sockets issued a
connect() without sending or receiving any data.
Multicast is one of the use cases for UDP sockets.
We observed 8 applications that used UDP sockets to
send multicast packets but only 2 applications joined
multicast groups. These 2 applications use multicast to
discover other similar applications on the same LAN,
e.g. using the Simple Service Discovery Protocol. A
typical example are streaming applications that allow
to discover another device where audio/video can be
streamed over the network.
5. TCP SOCKETS
SO_RCVTIMEO - 79%
TCP_INFO - 11%
SO_ERROR- 3%
SO_LINGER - 3%
SO_DEBUG - 3%
Others - 1%
Figure 2: getsockopt() and setsockopt() arguments for all
TCP sockets (local and remote). SO RCVTIMEO is by far
the most used argument. SO ERROR is often used after a
non-blocking connect(). The non-standard TCP INFO op-
tion is often retrieved. SO LINGER and SO DEBUG are
often used together before a close() call.
Without much surprise, all our Android applications
use TCP. SOCK STREAM sockets account for 73% of all
opened sockets. 63% of these TCP sockets connect()
to a remote address while 37% do not call connect()
or connect() to a loopback address. We first briefly
analyze these later sockets that interact with local dae-
mons or applications. We then analyze in more details
the sockets that connect to distant servers.
5.1 Local sockets
We observe that a staggering 73% of the local sock-
ets only call setsockopt(SO RCVTIMEO) once or sev-
eral times after the initial socket() call. As a re-
sult, figure 2 shows how the SO RCVTIMEO socket op-
tion dominates the setsockopt() and getsockopt()
arguments for TCP sockets (both local and remote).
Since SO RCVTIMEO only modifies the receiving timeout
of the target socket, these operations seem wasteful but
we could not find a valid explanation for this behavior.
Another 16% of the local sockets only call close() after
socket() and 3% call ioctl(SIOCGIWNAME) to deter-
mine if the current interface is wireless before closing
the socket. Table 4 summarizes these findings. While
85% of the UDP sockets use ioctl() to retrieve infor-
mation about the network, we rarely observe ioctl()
on TCP sockets. This supports our observation that ap-
plications prefer to perform ioctl() requests on UDP
sockets because they are less costly.
5.2 Remotely connected sockets
We now restrict our analysis to the 7505 TCP connec-
tions that were used to contact a remote host. Various
system calls could be used to create those connections.
However, our analysis reveals a common pattern of 16
socket API calls to open such a connection. This pat-
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37% Local sockets
27% setsockopt(SO RCVTIMEO)
6% Immediate close()
3% Determine if interface is wireless
1% Other usages
63% Remote sockets
59% Exchange data after connect()
4% Do not send/recv data from network
Table 4: TCP sockets usage. 37% do not connect() or
connect() to a loopback address while 63% connect() to
a remote address. Most local sockets only call setsock-
opt(SO RCVTIMEO).
socket()
setsockopt(SO_RCVTIMEO)
bind()
getsockname()
fcntl(F_GETFL)
fcntl(F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK=true)
connect()
poll(POLLOUT)
getsockopt(SO_ERROR)
fcntl(F_GETFL)
fcntl(F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK=false)
getsockname()
getsockopt(SO_RCVTIMEO)
getsockopt(SO_RCVTIMEO)
fcntl(F_GETFL)
fcntl(F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK=true)
… DATA TRANSMISSION…
Synchronous
setup
Asynchronous
connect()
Redundant
SO_RCVTIMEO
Non-blocking
Blocking
Figure 3: Opening pattern on TCP sockets. After a
synchronous setup phase that binds the socket, a non-
blocking connect() call is issued. After 2 redundant getsock-
opt(SO RCVTIMEO), the socket is turned in non-blocking
mode again before the transmission of data.
tern is illustrated in figure 3. It results from the inter-
actions between the IO part of the Java Android core
library [2] and the okhttp external library [19]. We
first observe a synchronous setup phase that binds the
socket. The setsockopt(SO RCVTIMEO) call is issued
by the OkHTTP library. Then, the socket is put in
non-blocking mode before the connect() call. The suc-
cessive fcntl() calls modify the O NONBLOCK bit while
keeping the values of the other flags. The getsockopt
(SO ERROR) call checks whether the connect() succeeded.
Then the socket is turned synchronous again and we ob-
serve two redundant calls to getsockopt(SO RCVTIMEO),
probably related to the TLS library [6]. Finally, the
socket is put in non-blocking mode again before the
TLS handshake. The two getsockname() calls are is-
sued by the Android Java Socket to cache the local
address before and after the connect() call.
Surprisingly, 15 applications use the listen() call.
Among those, only 11 ever accepted an incoming con-
nection with accept() or accept4(). Among the 449
incoming connection observed, 98% originated from a
loopback address. We noticed 5 connections originating
from a link-local address while 3 connections originated
from a remote network. These 3 remote incoming con-
nections were accepted by a single application, Skype,
that uses NAT traversal.
Let us now focus our analysis on the data trans-
fer. 94% of the TCP sockets exchange data after the
connect() call. Almost all applications use the generic
read() and write() calls. Only half of them use their
dedicated socket counterparts, recv() and send(). Given
the cost of issuing system calls, networking textbooks
recommend to use large buffers when transferring data.
TCPSnitch allows to dissect how applications use each
call. Figure 4 shows a cumulative distribution function
for the size of the buffer given the the various receive
functions. Surprisingly, we observe that respectively
34% and 16% of the recv() and recvfrom() calls use
a buffer of exactly 1 byte and we also observe a lot of
5 bytes long buffers. Overall, about half of the recv()
calls are passed a buffer of 5 bytes or less.
These functions support optional flags. The most
popular sending flag is MSG NOSIGNAL which is set on
60% of the calls. This flag requests not to send the
SIGPIPE signal, which by default terminates the pro-
cess, when an application writes to a disconnected socket.
It is particularly useful for libraries since this flag does
not modify the process signal handlers. Only two other
sending flags are used: MSG DONTWAIT and MSG MORE.
13% of the calls are non-blocking thanks to the MSG DONTWAIT
flag. MSG MORE is set on 2% of the calls to indicate that
more data is coming. The other sending flags2 are never
used. 18% of the receiving calls are turned non-blocking
using the MSG DONTWAIT flag and 16% of the calls set
the MSG PEEK flag to peek on the TCP receive queue
without removing data. Finally, a tiny fraction of those
receiving calls (0.04%) set MSG WAITALL to request the
operating system to block until it has enough data to
fill the buffer. The remaining flags3 do not appear in
our traces.
As observed for the connection establishment, there is
a very frequent pattern for the termination of a connec-
tion. 78 applications and about half of all opened sock-
ets use getsockopt(SO DEBUG) and getsockopt(SO LINGER)
before issuing close(). The utilization of SO DEBUG at
this point of the connection is surprising. We investi-
gated the Android source code and confirmed its us-
age in the IO Java core library of Android [1] where a
function closes all file descriptors. Because sockets us-
ing SO LINGER need some additional processing to avoid
the socket API close() call to block, a getsockopt()
is issued to detect if the file descriptor is a socket. If
this call succeeds, then the file descriptor is indeed a
socket. It seems that a failed getsockopt(SO DEBUG) is
less critical from a performance viewpoint than a failed
2MSG CONFIRM, MSG DONTROUTE, MSG EOR and MSG OOB
3MSG CMSG CLOEXEC, MSG ERRQUEUE, MSG OOB, MSG TRUNC
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function of the buffer
size passed to the different receive functions. Half of the
recv() calls use a buffer of 5 bytes or less.
getsockopt(SO LINGER), hence its use. This closing
pattern would certainly be observed on a much higher
proportion of the sockets if TCPSnitch could terminate
cleanly the traced Android applications.
5.3 Socket options
Socket options can be used by applications to tune
the behavior of the underlying TCP/IP stack. Linux
supports a growing number of non-standard socket op-
tions. Figure 5 shows how many applications use the
main socket options observed in our dataset. Several of
these options are expected and some were discussed ear-
lier, TCP INFO was more surprising. This non-standard
Linux TCP option exports to the application counters
maintained by the TCP stack. The standard Android
Java API does not expose this socket option and ap-
plications must resort to a C/C++ library to use it.
Still, 28 applications make use of this socket option.
As expected, those are mostly highly popular applica-
tions such as Youtube, Chrome, Facebook or Spotify.
For these applications, TCP INFO was retrieved by 26%
of the SOCK STREAM sockets and 73% of these sockets
retrieve TCP INFO only once. Facebook, Messenger and
Instagram are the only applications that issue dozens of
TCP INFO on a single TCP connection. For instance, we
observed a Facebook TCP connection lasting 32 seconds
where TCP INFO was retrieved about 3000 times, almost
as often as the 3500 recv() calls on the same connec-
tion. These TCP INFO calls do not specifically happen at
the start or the end of a connection, but seem uniformly
distributed during the lifetime of the TCP connection.
As figure 2 shows, TCP INFO is the second most used
socket option argument for TCP sockets.
6. DISCUSSION
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Socket options usage on TCP sockets
Figure 5: Number of applications using each socket op-
tion. SO ERROR is often used after a non blocking con-
nect(). SO RCVTIMEO appears at the beginning of most
TCP connections. SO DEBUG and SO LINGER are used
together before close(). TCP INFO is used by a surprisingly
large number of applications.
We have proposed TCPSnitch, an application that in-
tercepts network system and library calls on the Linux
and Android platforms to collect more information about
their usage, including the parameters passed to those
API calls. We collected more than 2.3 millions calls
made by 90 popular applications on sixteen thousands
sockets. The application and the collected dataset are
publicly available4.
Our analysis revealed several interesting patterns for
the utilization of the socket API on Android applica-
tions. First, in an IPv6 enabled WiFi network, these
applications prefer IPv6 over IPv4. Second, UDP sock-
ets are mainly used as a shortcut to retrieve informa-
tion about the network configuration. Third, many An-
droid applications use the same pattern of system calls
to establish and terminate TCP connections. Fourth,
Android applications use various socket options, even
some like TCP INFO that are not directly exposed by
the standard Java API.
TCPSnitch and its associated website already provide
a good overview of how real applications use the socket
API. Our future work will be to add traces from more
applications in the database and support other plat-
forms starting with MacOS.
4The entire dataset can be explored via https://
tcpsnitch.org. The TCPSnitch source code is available
from https://github.com/GregoryVds/tcpsnitch and the
web interface can be retrieved from https://github.com/
GregoryVds/tcpsnitch_web.
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